John S. La Tour, Individually
Defendant

RESPONSE TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The defendant captioned above now responds to the jury instructions submitted by the City of Fayetteville ("city").

In all of its standard jury instructions submissions, the city has provided accurate instructions for the jury in this case. However, in the instructions peculiar to this case, the city has subtly distorted the codified law and has proposed money-fine levels which amount to former jeopardy. It is our sincere prayer that such distortions will be acknowledged by the court and summarily eliminated.

"Flashing Sign" Definition Distorted

The Fayetteville Unified Development Ordinance ("UDO") defines a flashing sign as:

"An illuminated sign on which artificial or reflected lights is not maintained stationary and constant in intensity and color at all times when in use (emphasis supplied)". Fayetteville UDO Sect. 158.03.

However, the city’s proposed jury instructions completely and conveniently leave out the qualifying phrase, "when in use". Without this phrase, the implication would be that light intensity must be maintained constant at ALL times. If this were the case, simply turning an electronic sign off or on would be a criminal act!

A much more rational approach to construing the statute would be that when the lights on the sign are operating, they cannot change color or brightness, or move.

Double or Former Jeopardy

1. The Fayetteville Municipal Court system and the Washington County Circuit Court system are both operated by virtue of the State of Arkansas laws, rules, and the Arkansas State Constitution. Accordingly, both judicial systems are part of the State of Arkansas overall judicial system.

2. The Fayetteville Municipal Count, convicted me, on January 3, 2001, of violating the city sign ordinance. For this crime, I was fined $1025.00. This fine was paid on or about February 2, 2001 by John S. La Tour, individually.

2. The appeal at bar is being tried de novo. I am aware that a de novo trial in Circuit Court is unaffected by what occurred in the inferior court.

3. The City is now requesting that jury instructions be given that allow maximum fines of $49,750.00 for both John S. La Tour and Sprint Tax, Inc. for a total of $99,500.00.

4. The City’s proposed fine is nearly 100 times what the Municipal Court thought was fair and just punishment.

5. I appeal to this Court. Please do not allow such a gross violation of equity principles, everyday common sense fairness, and justice.

6. Most Americans, including the nine that sit on the U.S. Supreme Court, would probably be dismayed to learn that in Arkansas, a person can be tried, convicted, and fined for an offense. Then, because of the application of Arkansas’ de novo concept, the same person can be tried a second time for the same offence and potentially fined almost 100 times more than he/she was fined the first time.

Such gross injustice can serve no public good and can only give rise to claims of double jeopardy under the U.S. Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, Section 8. In connection therewith we note the following:

a. There was a former prosecution in the same state for the same offense, and,

b. A person was actually placed in jeopardy, convicted, fined, and the fine collected, and

c. John S. La Tour was that person, and,

d. The offense charged in the first prosecution is the same offense being charged in this Court.

 

7. The de novo principles should be applied and construed consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution, Article 2, Sect. 8.

8. Thus, I respectfully move that the maximum fine given in the jury instructions should be the same amount as already paid, $1025.00. Moreover, if I am convicted again, I also move that the fine already paid should be credited to the new fine imposed and if I am acquitted, I further move that the City of Fayetteville be order to refund the $1025.00 it has already collected from me.

Corporate Representation

In the continuing battle over whether I am allowed to represent Sprint Tax, Inc. in this appeal, I now concede. The City is correct; I am not allowed to represent Sprint Tax, Inc. because I am not a licensed practicing attorney. I am simply a corporate officer and outside of small claims divisions of Arkansas municipal courts, corporate officers are barred from representing their employer corporations.

As the city has amply noted, the Arkansas Supreme Court has ruled that the proper remedy for such representation is the striking of all of the filings made on behalf of the corporation by the corporate officer.

Indeed, the court noted that,

"…proceedings …conducted by one not entitled to practice are a nullity, and if appropriate steps are timely taken the suit may be dismissed, a judgment in the cause reversed, or the steps of the unauthorized practitioner disregarded." All City Glass and Miror, Inc. v. McGraw Hill Information Systems Co., Div. Of McGraw Hill, Inc. 750 S.W.2d 395 (1988).

Accordingly, John S. La Tour, as a corporate officer, did not have the power to file an appeal for Sprint Tax, Inc. The Municipal Court judgment was only in the name of John S. La Tour. Sprint Tax, Inc. was not even named in the proceeding in Municipal Court. Thus, Sprint Tax, Inc. should have never appealed the ruling of the Municipal Court since it was never a party to the proceeding. Moreover, all of the filings made by Sprint Tax, Inc. in this proceeding should be nullified and struck as a nullity.

In these regards, the Court should know that John S. La Tour, individually paid the entire $1025.00 fine that was imposed by the Municipal Court. John S. La Tour, individually is the only real party in interest in this proceeding and should be the only party listed as a defendant.